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The relation between the climate regulation and the multilateral trade regime is a rising issue 
in the field of international governance. This article presents the options available to OPEC 
economies related to this. It analyses the option of introducing a carbon tax or border 
adjustment measures in the core of the WTO regime. It demonstrates that this option is not 
sustainable for both institutional and political economy reasons. This is why the article argues 
that the way to build a climate-compatible trade regulation which takes into account oil 
exporting countries’ interests is to elaborate a cross-institutional cooperation between the 










































1. Introduction  
For both production and comsuption purposes, OPEC economies will in all likelihood 
prepare themselves for a post-oil economy. They will be subject to negative externalities 
related to both climate change and response measures taken to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. One of the major rising questions of the post-Kyoto climate regulation is the 
relation between climate and trade policies (Brewer, 2010).  
There are in the European Union, the United States and other countries many studies and 
thinking about the way to link trade and climate regimes Biermann et al., 2010). This question 
is linked, on the one hand, to the production and the exchange of goods containing carbon and 
on the other hand to the establishment of industrial and development policies. This is why it is 
an issue of great interest to OPEC members be they or not members of the WTO
1. The 
linkages between trade and climate change refers, for example, to issues such as tariffs and 
non-tariffs barrier to trade, investment and technology transfer regarding climate-friendly 
goods and technology, border measures that address international competitiveness, 
government procurement, subsidies programmes that promote exports, foreign direct 
investments and technology transfers especially to emerging and oil exporting countries
2.  
The policies to reduce greenhouse gases have raised concerns about the adverse 
competitiveness effects for energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors and the allocational 
effects of border tax adjustment or border carbon adjustment (BTA/BCA) (Dröge and 
Kemfert, 2005; Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). The literature on computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) has mainly focused on assessing competitiveness and leakage effects associated with 
the implementation of these policies, especially in the EU and the US (Peterson and Klepper, 
2008). Over this, climate mitigation policies that target oil consumption will slow growth in 
OPEC countries revenues from oil exports (Dessai, 2004). The imposition of carbon taxes – 
or any equivalent measures – by developed countries is able to reduce demand for oil and may 
cause a decline in the global price of oil. For our part, we maintain that moving away from a 
regime of carbon-intensive growth or creating a low-carbon economy, which is the key 
economic stake of climate change mitigation and adaptation, cannot be approached through 
the single issue of competitiveness and BTA/BCA measures.  
This article deals with the multilateral trade strategies that would contribute to the 
articulation of both climate and trade regimes. The lack of a consensus on a global climate 
agreement for post-2012 could make the WTO the main arena where the future global 
regulation against climate warming could be elaborated and implemented such as a border tax 
adjustment
3. This is why OPEC countries should be aware of the different policy options 
available within the WTO and the ways synergy between climate and trade regulation could 
be built on taking into account their trade and development interests. Oil exporting countries 
must pay attention to any trade and climate regulation that could reduce their right to export 
fossil fuels.  
                                                 
1 Excepting Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya who are observer governments and United Arab Emirates who are not even 
an observer, all others OPEC members are also WTO members. 
2 Many different trade policy measures, with quite different implications, could be listed as border adjustment 
measures: countervailing carbon tariffs levied on the carbon content of goods, voluntary export restraints 
arrangements with nations without carbon controls, exemption of energy-intensive sectors from carbon policy, 
the rebate of carbon taxes on energy-intensive exports and the subsidization of energy-intensive exports. 
3 For example, on the 13
th of September 2010 Japan has initiated a trade dispute against Canada related to 
renewable energy and on the 6
th of January 2011, United States has initiated one against China related to wind 
power equipment. This could create a precedent to the way the WTO catch up the international climate 









































The idea that we wish to promote here is that of climate-compatible regulation of 
international trade, which places the focus on how trade policy can be put to the service of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. The aim would be to build on the existing climate 
and trade regimes to create fair, inclusive and effective regulatory mechanisms which would 
take into account the interests of both developing and oil exporting countries. The expression 
“climate-compatible regulation of international trade” highlights the central premise of the 
article: the need for cross-institutional cooperation on climate change, i.e., a system of 
multilateral governance  linking the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) with the WTO Agreements.  
Thus, after examining the global economy associated with commitments made to fight 
against climate change, we will examine the extent to which border adjustment measures 
would be compatible with the World Trade Organisation regime, in particular the 1994 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Because the compatibility of a CO2 tax 
with the multilateral framework is a highly problematic issue, we will examine the possible 
strategies open for drawing up its proposed climate-compatible regulation. Three options are 
presented. The first would be to liberalise trade in environmental goods and services (EGS) as 
an incentive to combat climate change. The second would be to grant derogation from the 
multilateral norm. The final option would be to create a cross-institutional cooperation 
between the UNFCCC and the WTO. 
2. Competitive vs. Development issue  
As regards the implementation of an international mechanism to fight climate change, the 
socio-economic costs of reducing emissions, as well as those of preventive and adaptive 
measures, remain unclear. However, as the situation currently stands, the cost of the policies 
required in this area is unevenly spread between countries. What is more, in the absence of 
enforcement mechanisms and effective dispute resolutions which remain the main weakness 
of the Kyoto Protocol (Barrett, 2008) the problem of international competitiveness rears its 
head. In fact efforts to reduce emissions will change the market prices of traded goods, 
causing comparative advantage in green-house-gas-intensive industries to shift toward other 
countries (Wooders and Cosbey, 2010). This is because developing countries have no 
quantitative reduction targets while in developed countries the terms of implementation of 
emission reduction targets generate additional costs for certain industries. In a context of 
economic globalisation, in which one of the main characteristics is the great freedom of 
capital and firms, the Kyoto basic architecture gives producers without carbon-constraints 
comparative advantages. Industries in developed countries are therefore confronted with a 
double-edged competitiveness problem, affecting both exports to non-industrialized countries 
and their competitive position in the internal market.  
As Roberts and Park (2007) argue in relation to the distributional problem of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the changes induced in the position of countries in the global division of labour 
reduce the prospect for cooperation. Thus, the cost of CO2 emission reduction policies could 
lead to a significant drop in the competitiveness of companies subject to carbon constraints, 
with some transferring production to regions where production methods are less energy 
efficient (Reinaud, 2004; Cowi-Unice, 2004)
4. The extent of the risk of industrial migration as 
a result of carbon emissions taxation will vary greatly depending on the different sectors and 
                                                 
4 The IPCC in its 2001 assessment concluded that “the possible relocation of some carbon-intensive industries to 
non-annex I [developing] countries and wider impacts on trade flows in response to changing prices may lead to 
leakage in the order of 5 to 20 percent” (IPCC, 2001). If an emissions reduction of 5% were to be achieved in 
industrialized world, which is what the Kyoto Protocol calls for, 1 percent of these emissions would not 
disappear completely, but would become developing-world emissions due to shifting industrial activity (World 









































industries (SQW, 2006; Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007). The studies available indicate that 
energy-intensive or electricity-hungry sectors that are unable to pass on the extra cost of 
carbon emissions to consumers and which have no scope for reducing other production costs 
(e.g., the steel, metallurgical, aluminium, cement, glass, paper and oil refining industries) will 
be those most seriously affected
5. The competitive issue must be viewed in strategic terms 
rather than on a static, immediate basis. At this level, the New International Economics 
focuses on the dynamic effects of a marginal and temporary loss of competitiveness on both 
the industrial specialization of a geographic area – such as the EU – and the growth path of 
this area (Gomory and Baumol, 2000; Rivera-Batiz and Oliva, 2003). 
The literature draws attention to the costs of implementing climate change mitigation 
policies and discusses in particular: (i) whether countries embarking on stricter climate 
policies will shift from consumption of domestically produced carbon-containing goods to 
cheaper carbon-intensive imports from regions without comparable climate change policies 
(leakage issue); and (ii) whether they would spur the offshoring of carbon-intensive 
production to such regions (Lockwood and Whalley, 2010).  
All OPEC economies are Non-Annex I parties, which means that they do not have any 
obligations regarding greenhouse gas emission reductions. This does not mean as Barnett 
(2008) argues that they avoid reductions in the emissions of greenhouses gases and “work 
very hard to block and delay progress in the climate change”. OPEC economies are facing a 
huge challenge related to the fact that any requirements that would encourage the transition to 
a low-carbon economy could unfavourably affect their economies especially if the low-carbon 
economy transition is biased toward oil (Karas et al., 2005; Reddy and Assenza, 2008). So, 
the linkage between trade and climate regimes could affect the OPEC countries sustainable 
development. This is why the Article 4.7 provides a balance of obligations among UNFCCC 
Parties which requires that “the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention 
related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that 
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties”. The Article 4.10 adds that “the Parties shall 
(…) take into consideration in the implementation of the commitments of the Convention the 
situation of Parties (…) with economies that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the 
implementation of measures to respond to climate change. This applies notably to Parties 
with economies that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, 
processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive 
products”.  
However, there is concern that the use of trade measures by developed countries that 
apparently address climate change issues may in fact lead to restricting the market access of 
countries like OPEC members in developed countries. The World Bank (2008) modelization 
of the competitiveness effect of carbon-based border adjustment measures implies that such 
measures imposed by developed countries could reduce the export opportunities of 
developing countries to some extent. In the United States and European Union BTA/BCA are 
increasingly considered as a “price of passage” for any ambitious climate legislation as they 
require importers of energy-intensive goods to pay additional tax or to purchase emission 
                                                 
5 For example, Grubb and Neuhoff (2006), using the NVAS (net value at stake), which represents the sector’s 
exposure to indirect costs through electricity price impacts, show that three sectors: Cement, Iron and Steel and 
Non-ferrous Metals (principally aluminium) and some sub-sectors (glass and ceramics, chemicals) will be 










































allowance at the border (Yu III, 2009) or even to impose restriction in respect of “foreign-
emitted carbon” (Pauwelyn, 2007). Trade-related environmental measures (TREMS) 
designed to “level the playing field” between countries that have put in place different degrees 
of climate regulation in place, are now being considered as part of the “climate package” in 
number of major trading economies (UNEP, 2009). Or, as Hagen et al. (2003) show, any 
sanctioning mechanism for non-compliance could lead to a welfare decrease in the OPEC 
region.  
So, the issue of a BTA/BCA taken by industrialized countries is related to the economic 
development strategy and socioeconomic stability of oil exporting countries. Climate 
mitigation and adaptation policies taken by OECD countries for example and that target oil 
consumption will slow growth in revenues from oil exports. This in turn could affect the 
capacity to finance the need for technical assistance for economic diversification to improve 
industrial and energy infrastructures, to develop renewable energy technologies and to 
commit in “ecological modernization” (Reiche, 2010). In fact climate change negotiations are 
an opportunity to start diversification strategies if the multilateral trading system allows a 
policy space for it.  
By highlighting these issues, the combat against climate change raises questions about the 
conditions of trade and investments that place it on the margins of the field of competence of 
the WTO’s multilateral trade regime. We shall now examine the limits of the way the WTO 
regime deals with the issue of climate change.  
3. WTO rules and agreements related to climate change measures 
There is no consensus on whether the WTO should adopt a position on climate change or 
even whether the latter has a place in the WTO regime (Horn and Mavrodis, 2010). As Pascal 
Lamy, the WTO Director General, said “trade and the WTO toolbox of trade rules more 
specifically, can – at best – offer no more than part of the answer to climate change. It is not 
in the WTO that a deal on climate change can be struck”
6. But the WTO Agreements 
contains a set of rules which could be used to link trade and climate policies. The details are 
shown in Table 1. 














6 Pascal Lamy, Director General, speech at the Informal Trade Ministers’ Dialogue on Climate Change in Bali 










































Table 1 WTO rules related to climate policies 
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Market-based and incentive measures 
 
Kyoto flexibility mechanisms (emission 
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Source: composition of the author 
As the use of fiscal measures – carbon tax – is frequently mentioned, we explore in detail this 
issue. Is a border adjustment measure compatible with the WTO regime? How the nature of a 
carbon tax or a tax on the carbon content of fossil fuels should be interpreted remains 
ambiguous (Goh, 2004)
7. The Border Tax Adjustment Working Party under the GATT did 
not reach any agreement. The manner in which the WTO Members will behave is a political 
rather than legal issue, as the issue relies on the existence of a gentleman’s agreement 
between WTO Members (Hoerner and Muller, 1996). In practice, the problem must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis within the scope of the WTO procedure for dispute 
settlement. Subsidies pose no problem as long as they are not specific to a sector, a company 
or a product. 
The feasibility of a border adjustment measure presupposes that it is compatible with the 
principles of trade multilateralism, in particular Article III of the GATT 1994 relating to 
national treatment
8. If the EU were to introduce such a measure it would need to be specific 
regarding the three following themes, though this would be no guarantee of compatibility.  
                                                 
7 Taxing finished products is problematic not just in view of the taxes on the materials used in their productions, 
but also for three reasons linked to the WTO system: i) the tax terminology and typology contained in article 
III.2 in unclear; ii) in the absence of a consensus, the working Party on border adjustments has made no ruling; 
iii) the definition of tax occultes adopted by the Working Party document leaves some doubt over the feasibility 
of carbon tax.  
 
8 Article III of the GATT prohibits discrimination between domestic products and imported products. Article 
III.1 sets out the general principle of prohibiting protectionist measures. Article III.2 prohibits the discrimination 
created by internal taxation, while article III.4 prohibits discrimination created by international regulations of a 
non-tax nature. Both of these provisions prohibit discrimination between like products but the scope of the term 
is different between Article III.2 and Article III.4. Article III.2 also prohibits discrimination against competitive 









































The basis of the tax  
The BTA/BCA could only be applied to basic high-emission products or those that are 
very sensitive to electricity prices. But a border tax adjustment is only permitted in the case of 
so-called taxes “on the product”, as in the case of VAT. It cannot be applied to so-called taxes 
“on production” or “on the producer”. The WTO regime is considered to address primarily 
regulations aimed at products rather than production. Thus, tax on the latter cannot normally 
be adjusted at the borders. This characteristic makes it necessary to clarify environmental 
taxation, as well as its relationship with domestic taxation and with measures to regulate 
access to the markets.  
The effects of the measure  
GATT/WTO jurisprudence has always concluded that the volume of trade has no bearing 
when it comes to adherence to the provisions of Article III of the GATT. The only factor to be 
considered is whether or not competition distortion occurs
9. Similarly, even the existence of a 
minimum tax differential is enough to establish discrimination between like products. With 
reference to Article III.1 and III.2, the “Korea – Taxes on alcoholic beverages”
10 panel 
concluded that the WTO regime does not tolerate a “minimum taxation amount” and that the 
requirements of Article III of GATT run counter to a measure that favours domestic products, 
even if trade is not disrupted or the measure has not yet been implemented.  
The similarity of products 
The GATT/WTO texts lack criteria that would make it possible to decide whether or not 
two or more products are similar, or “like”. Two doctrines come into conflict here. The first 
states that products obtained using different production processes cannot be considered as 
“like products”. Production process and methods (PPMs) may also be at the root of a 
distinction between products under the terms of Articles I and III of the GATT (Chaytor and 
Cameron, 1995). The second doctrine considers that likeness depends on physical properties, 
nature and quality, on end-uses, on consumers’ tastes and habits, as well as on the tariff 
classification of products. In this case, the production process used to make these products 
does not come into consideration when assessing their likeness. GATT/WTO jurisprudence 
tends to favour the latter of the two doctrines. Furthermore, any product standards or technical 
regulations that establish minimum requirements for goods on the basis of their energy or 
greenhouse gas emission during production might conflict with the national treatment 
principle under the WTO and the GATT-1994 (Santarius et al., 2004).  
However, the debate is not over, since according to the Appellate Body, the notion of 
similarity must be examined on a case-by-case basis depending on the context and 
circumstances. This grants panels a discretionary margin when weighing up the criteria to be 
used and their respective importance.  
For example, there is a certain amount of ambiguity in considering that the hazardousness 
and toxicity of a product can be used as differentiation criteria
11. This paves the way for the 
assertion that a CO2-intensive product is more hazardous than another “like” product with a 
                                                 
9 Japan – Taxes on alcoholic beverages, United States – Taxes on oil and certain imported products, India – 
Measures relating to the automotive sector. 
 
10 For details see DS75 and DS 84 “Korean, Republic of – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages” at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm   
 
11 In the Asbestos dispute, the Appellate Body considered that a product’s hazardousness could be taken into 
consideration from the moment it affected the product’s physical properties or governed the competitive 









































lower CO2 content. However, because the Agreement on technical barriers to trade indicates 
that “Members shall specify technical regulations based on product requirements in terms of 
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics” (article 2.8), it is necessary to 
prove that divergent methods have an impact on the intrinsic quality of products. The main 
conclusion is that only a dispute settlement on the question of using a carbon tax to fight 
against climate change is likely to resolve the issue of targeted trade measures favouring 
climate change mitigation. But there is no guarantee that it will result in a definitive solution 
that is in line with the measure’s environmental aims.  
In this section we focused on carbon-motivated tax adjustments and whether such a 
measure is WTO compatible. The trading regime and jurisprudence of the WTO would allow 
in theory for the creation of targeted trade measures favouring the fight against climate 
change. But considerable uncertainty prevails (Frankel, 2008). Only the settlement of a 
dispute on an issue of this nature is likely to resolve the possible incompatibility and there is 
no guarantee that it would result in a definitive solution that would be in line with the 
measure’s environmental aims.  
However, because of its economic, social and political implications, the climate change 
agenda is much more complex than other issues addressed by other multilateral environmental 
agreements. It calls for changes in production, consumption and growth models both in 
developed and developing countries. It is unlikely that a tax would be enough to 
“decarbonize” economic growth. What is needed is a more wide-reaching solution that can be 
achieved by including environmental compatibility in the trade regime. We shall now go on to 
discuss this policy option, which would involve a climate-compatible trade offer, derogations 
from the WTO Agreements and the creation of a UNFCCC-WTO governance system.  
4. A political economy of climate-compatible trade regulation 
It is possible that some OECD’s countries draw up trade offer for developing countries 
that would reflect their concerns and constraints. This calls for a new balance to be 
established between trade rights and obligations. The WTO consensus rule requires and 
encourages to seek the broadest possible compromise. But the principle of joint but 
differentiated responsibility affords developing countries a special status that complicates the 
use of trade policy instruments when dealing with these nations. This is reinforced by the 
provisions of article XXXVII.1.c of GATT 1994, which normally prohibit “new fiscal 
measures” from being imposed upon them. That is why compensatory measures are 
necessary. What is more, such measures underline the fact that the primary objective is not to 
discriminate against countries but to support the fight against climate change. 
The EU and the US could set up a “Generalised System of Preferences Plus” (GSP+), 
which would benefit those countries that agree to make additional efforts to reduce CO2. Thus 
if the United States grants no trade preferences to China or oil-exporting countries, nothing 
prevents the EU from withholding preferences from countries that do not respect the Kyoto 
Protocol and, more specifically, from granting a GSP+ to countries that commit to multilateral 
mechanisms to combat climate change, insofar as these preferences are based on objective 
criteria in accordance with the conclusions regarding the EC-GSP dispute. There is apparently 
nothing to prevent reference being made to the UNFCCC, especially when we consider that 
the European GSP has evolved over the last few years based on ad hoc criteria, which are 
sometimes entirely unrelated to trade. However, this strategy could come up against two 
obstacles. First, the inclusion of climate policy objectives in the GSP could be perceived by 
developing countries as a form of political conditionality. Second, unless the content and form 
of this GSP+ is clearly defined, such a measure may come into conflict with the principle of 









































Lastly, the paragraph 31.1 of the Doha Declaration defines a mandate related to the 
liberalisation of trade in green products, services and technologies. The Friend of EGS
12 
emphasized that a WTO-wide deal eliminating all tariffs on trade in green technologies and 
energy-saving equipment would be the way to a business-friendly global solution to climate 
change. They also stated that any post-2012 agreement should include the creation of an open 
global market in environmental technologies and an investment regime supporting green 
industrial change. They consider that through this solution trade policy can help create 
incentives to the adoption of good environmental policy.  
As things stand, negotiations have come up against the problem of definitions and the 
classification of environmental good and services
13, the inclusion of production methods and 
processes in the scope of negotiations, the inclusion of non-tariff barriers, how liberalisation 
should be approached (list approach, project approach, integrated approach) (Sugathan, 2008) 
and how to deal with products that also have non-environmental uses. Thus, talks are not 
progressing either in substance or in form. Furthermore, total liberalisation of trade in EGS 
would concern only a marginal volume of trade and goods that already have very low average 
tariffs. In addition, there is no strong potential for the liberalisation of trade in low-carbon 
goods to contribute to climate change objectives (Cosbey, 2008). Last, the final stumbling 
block in these negotiations concerns the resulting differentiation between North and South, 
the developing countries being net importers of EGS and related clean energy technologies. 
Liberalisation would benefit only developed countries and a few emerging economies (Brazil, 
China, India and Mexico) (Claro et al., 2007). Focussing on this type of solution would thus 
exacerbate trade antagonism between North and South, something that is not needed by the 
WTO nor by those involved in climate change negotiations.  
5. Building synergies by a derogation from the multilateral trade rules 
A BTA/BCA could be introduced in the multilateral trading system to obtain derogation 
by using the argument of the non-trade objective. Such environmental exemption from the 
multilateral trade rules can be achieved in two ways.  
The first involves starting a procedure under the terms on Article IX.3 of the WTO 
Agreement. In fact, Article IX.3, “in exceptional circumstances” and in the framework of a 
Ministerial Conference, authorises a Member to request a waiver concerning its obligations 
under the WTO Agreements. The Member may be granted this waiver only by consensus or 
by a decision taken by three quarters of the Members. A member must prove that the climate 
change mitigation measures that it intends to implement fall into the category of “exceptional 
circumstances”. Once this has been done, this member must embark upon a consensus 
building strategy in order to have the request accepted by the Members of the WTO, since the 
recognition of “exceptional circumstances” concerning a measure taken by a Member is based 
on their appraisal. Oil exporting countries should be aware of the possibility that the 
developed countries – EU especially – could build such a consensus. This could allow them to 
take measures which would restrict trade for climatic purpose.  
The second is linked to Article XX of the GATT 1994. Article XX is not to be confused 
with a waiver of WTO obligations which may be granted to a Member under Article IX.3 of 
the WTO Agreement. A waiver is a formal derogation granted by WTO Members to a 
                                                 
12 The Friends of EGS Group of countries comprises: Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, Chinese Taipei and the United States.  
 
13 This being so, the OECD, APEC, and UNCTAD have defined nomenclatures for environmental goods and 










































Member or a group of Members at the request of the latter, whereas Article XX is invoked in 
the context of a dispute, as an affirmative defence. The purpose of Article XX is to control the 
conditions under which Members may pursue or seek to achieve non-trade objectives. It 
comprises a series of exceptions that States are entitled to invoke and a “chapeau” designed to 
prevent States from abusing the facility.  
Paragraphs (b) and (g) on measures to “protect human, animal or plant life and health” 
and measures relating to the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources” may be invoked 
in the context of climate change. The aim under paragraph (b) would be to demonstrate that a 
tax would be a necessary additional measure to ensure the effectiveness of the tradable 
emission permit system or, under paragraph (g), that it relates to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources which could be affected by climate change. Furthermore, plans 
to introduce a border adjustment measure would have to fulfil the two conditions under the 
“chapeau” of article XX. The measure: (a) must not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; and (b) 
must not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.  
Lastly, in the case of justification under paragraph (b) of article XX, the measure would 
have to pass the “necessity test”. Neither the Convention nor the Protocol permit the use of 
trade measures to bring countries on board or encourage implementation. In fact Article 3.5 of 
the Convention (to which article 2.3 of the Protocol refers) prohibits the use of trade measures 
in attaining its objectives
14. The primary source of information for the dispute settlement 
procedure resides in the WTO Agreements. The articles 4.8.h in the UNFCCC makes special 
provisions for “countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from 
the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated 
energy-intensive products”. Thus it provides OPEC with a legal basis for challenging any 
trade regulation that could affect their petroleum trade. As the Appellate Body recalled in the 
United States – Gasoline dispute settlement (1996), citing Article 3.2 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding of the WTO Agreements, WTO law should not be read in “clinical 
isolation” from public international law. This is why panels or the Appellate Body will never 
go beyond what is provided for in the UNFCCC (Appleton, 2001). It is therefore unlikely that 
a trade measure would be approved, even temporarily. So, Developing countries and oil 
exporters can argue that the next climate agreement contain a clause forbidding the use of a 
tax or any other trade means aimed at getting an agreement on emissions reductions.  
In the WTO, decisions have to be taken by consensus. The consensus rule gives power to 
countries who are objecting to specific decisions. This is why OPEC would insist on linking 
trade and climate regime, and if this occurred, it would have to be addressed within the WTO. 
The increasing heterogeneity along other variables such as growth, population, emission, 
development and importance for the international economy is creating incentives among the 
most successful G77 states (Chine, India, Brazil) towards bilateral or major emitting 
agreements with industrialized countries. Here again multilateral fora (WTO, UNFCCC) have 
to be preferred. In order to control the construction of the synergy between the WTO’s 
                                                 
14 Article 3.5 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) notes that “The parties should cooperate 
to promote (…) [an] open international economic system” and that “measures taken to combat climate change, 
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised 
restriction on international trade”. Article 2.3 of the Kyoto Protocol notes that parties shall “strive to implement 
policies and measures (…) in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects (…) on 
international trade and social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing 
country Parties and in particular those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, taking into 










































agreements and multilateral environmental agreements, OPEC should increase the speed of its 
full membership demand process to the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment. 
Presented in October 2000, this request still has not been completed.  
The situation that prevails since Cancun conference requires a rethinking of international 
cooperation in the framework of a regime that would rest essentially upon national and/or 
regional initiatives. In order to avoid that unilateral trade measures be taken and a 
fragmentation of the climatic governance it seems opportune to think about a cross-
institutional cooperation between the UNFCCC and the WTO.  
6. Toward a trade and climate governance system 
The Copenhagen and Cancun agreements institute a situation where different regional 
groups will exist in the long term with different levels or requirements and climate policies 
which would lead to very different carbon prices. Hence the risk of trade measures to 
compensate for these discrepancies is a real.  
To avoid such a situation, OPEC members could adopt a positive agenda promoting the 
option of cross-institutional cooperation aimed at climate-compatible regulation of 
international trade. This option involves creating a joint WTO and Climate Convention 
working group
15. The remit of this working group would be three-fold: i) to set forth a list of 
environmental measures that are compatible with the WTO regime; ii) to clarify which of 
these two regimes takes precedence on questions of rights and obligations; iii) to remove any 
ambiguities that may cause conflicts relating to standards and juridiction (competence) 
between the Convention and the WTO Agreements. It seems necessary to bring further 
scientific economic and policy expertises on climate-trade linkages. This function might be 
the main one of the proposed cross-institutional governance system. 
If this work were to result in clauses and rules that specify links to the WTO Agreements, 
clauses that do not form part of the WTO regime, these would not legally bind panels or the 
Appellate Body, but would serve as a point of reference for the decisions they may be 
required to make. This is an important point that would help eliminate ambiguities as to the 
decisions made by the arbiters of international trade. In the long term this trans-institutional 
cooperation should be oriented towards the building of a carbon taxation international regime 
WTO friendly. 
The future climate regime will inevitably be a hybrid one, as the future framework for 
global climate governance will need to combine credible commitments, stability and flexible 
obligations. The UNFCCC is a closed system that all the countries have ratified. Thus the 
issue is not so much about non-Parties, but rather about Parties with less stringent 
commitments as the developing countries characterised by lower wages, large populations and 
strong growth and rapidly growing emissions are, as well as from the United States.  
DC’s and OPEC must stress the links between the Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility (CBDR) principle (article 3.1 of the UNFCCC) and the Special and 
Differential Treatment of the WTO Agreements. This would make it possible to start anew the 
negotiations for the Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment of the Doha 
Agenda, with the aim of making it compatible with the CBDR. As discussed by Yoshiro, the 
interpretation of CBDR may involve different rights and obligations, giving more flexibility 
to developing countries, a large time frame for implementing measures and also undertakings 
from developed countries to help developing countries by means of financial transfers, trade 
                                                 
15 The UNFCCC Secretariat has been granted observer status in the WTO’s Committee for Trade and 










































preferences or technical assistance (Yoshiro, 2002). In fact the WTO regime has competence 
on these issues. Thus, the studies and discussions of the Working Group on trade, debt and 
finance and the Working group on trade and transfer of technology could be developed and 
expanded to include climate change adaptation. Here too the issue is raised of building links 
with the multilateral trading regime. In the case of technology transfers, compliance with the 
criteria of the WTO TRIPS Agreement would need to be verified. Developing and oil 
exporting countries need to be able to access the best available technology and patented green 
technologies in a flexible and non-constraining manner. They could ask for a Green-TRIPs 
derogation, for example.  
Thus, it is not enough to implement a strategy of liberalising trade in EGS. In order to 
guarantee the participation of the developing countries in post-Kyoto process, the 
industrialized countries must adopt a strategy to include trade, technology transfers, financial 
assistance and sustainable development commitments related to the level of development of 
the different countries and to their specific needs.  
7. Conclusion 
The fight against climate change involves economic issues at a scale unknown in existing 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA). 
We analyse the issue of introducing a carbon border adjustment mechanism in the WTO 
regime. The design of this mechanism is extremely important, yet despite the efforts made in 
this respect there would still be uncertainties as to its legal acceptability. We therefore went 
on to explore the policy option of designing a climate-compatible trade agreement, what we 
call climate-compatible trade regulation. Four options were discussed and we stressed on the 
cross-institutional cooperation between UNFCCC and WTO.  
Ideally, the governance system would feature differentiated quantitative objectives to 
which all 194 UNFCCC Member States would commit, accompanied by financial and 
technological transfer guarantees and trade incentives related to the level of development, 
which would be compatible with the Special and Differentiated Treatment of the WTO and 
the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities of the UNFCCC. New approaches will be 
needed to engage with energy exporters a transition towards a low carbon economy. This 
requires a better understanding of their interests, economic, political and social priorities. It 
seems to us that a trans-institutional cooperation is able to provide enough flexibility to deal 
with the heterogeneity of the international community.  
OPEC’s economies are faced with a dire challenge of diversifying their economies. Thus, 
they should adopt a positive agenda which would take into account their specific development 
constraints and objectives. This agenda implies that: (i) their oil exports will not be faced with 
constraints for climate purposes; (ii) the green technology transfer issue will be answered by 
creating additional flexibilities under the Agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS) to facilitate the transfer of low-carbon technologies; (iii) building and 
introducing flexibilities in the WTO agreements related to their specific needs and constraints; 
(iv) negotiating an agreement defining the condition when unilateral trade measures, such as 
BTA/BCA would be acceptable and (v) the UNFCCC’s common and differentiated 
responsibility principle be clearly and operationally articulated to the WTO’ principle of 
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